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Insurance
by Dean A. Calloway*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey period, from June 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013, proved
eventful.' Over the past year, state and federal courts in Georgia had
occasion to interpret key provisions of Georgia's Insurance Code,
address novel issues of first impression, and resolve disputes with
significant policy implications for Georgia's insurance industry.
The following are among the more notable developments: (1) the
Georgia Supreme Court formally extended application of the rule in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mabry (the Mabry
rule),3 which is the requirement that an insurer compensate an insured
for his vehicle's diminished value resulting from an automobile
accident,' to real property insurance contracts;s (2) the supreme court
held that Georgia's insurance commissioner exceeded his authority by
promulgating Rule 120-2-20-.02 of Georgia's Comprehensive Rules and
Regulations,6 whereby he sought to extend the limitation period for
first-party actions against insurers in connection with non-fire-related
personal and real property losses to two years;7 and (3) the fundamental
premise of Georgia's Uninsured Motorist Act' was reaffirmed by the

* Counsel, Asbury Automotive Group, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. University of Washington
(B.A., 1991); Carnegie Mellon University (M.S., 1993); University of Chicago Law School
(J.D., 1996).
1. For an analysis of Georgia insurance law during the prior survey period, see Bradley
S. Wolff et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REv. 151 (2012).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-1-1 to -64-8 (2000 & Supp. 2013).
3. 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114 (2001).
4. Id. at 509, 556 S.E.2d at 123.
5. Royal Capital Dev., LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 291 Ga. 262, 263, 728 S.E.2d 234, 235
(2012) [hereinafter Royal Capital I].
6. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-20-.02 (2012).
7. White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 291 Ga. 306, 309, 728 S.E.2d 685, 686 (2012).
8. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp, 2013).
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Georgia Court of Appeals, holding that an injured party could not
configure a settlement to recover compensation beyond the party's
"actual injuries and losses."
II.

PoLIcY INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITIONS

Georgia courts had ample opportunity during the survey period to
address issues involving interpretation of insurance policy provisions.
A.

Faulty Workmanship Qualifies as an "Occurrence"
In Maxum Indemnity Co. v. Jimenez,o the court of appeals held that
a loss resulting from faulty workmanship was covered as an "occurrence"
under a standard commercial general liability (CGL) policy."
As
recounted therein, the insured, a subcontractor, was engaged to install
pipes in a dormitory construction project. Following the construction of
the dormitory, a pipe burst, causing damage to several units. A jury
trial ensued, and the subcontractor was found liable for $191,382.01 in
damages attributable to his negligent work. The subcontractor's insurer,
Maxum Indemnity Company (Maxum), filed an action for declaratory
judgment, seeking a declaration that the claim against the subcontractor
was not covered under the policy. The Superior Court of Gwinnett
County granted judgment in the subcontractor's favor and Maxum
appealed, arguing that the claim against the subcontractor was not
covered as "property damage" under the policy because the judgment
entered against the subcontractor in the underlying suit was for
contractual indemnity and breach of contract, claims purportedly outside
the scope of the policy's coverage for property damage arising out of tort
liability.12
The court of appeals rejected Maxum's argument, noting that the
underlying claims against the subcontractor-regardless of their
configuration-were based upon the subcontractor's negligence, namely
his defective workmanship, and the resulting property damage to the
dormitory.a Consequently, the policy covered the underlying claims
against the subcontractor."

9.
(2013).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271, 274, 739 S.E.2d 750, 753
318 Ga. App. 669, 734 S.E.2d 499 (2012).
Id. at 669, 671, 734 S.E.2d at 501, 503.
Id. at 669-72, 734 S.E.2d at 501-03.
Id. at 673, 734 S.E.2d at 504.
Id.
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B. Intentional Conduct with Unforeseen CircumstancesDoes Not
Constitute an "Accident"
In Capital City Insurance Co. v. Forks imber Co., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held that a
CGL policy issued to a logging company by Capital City Insurance
Company (Capital City) did not cover unforeseen losses resulting from
an intentional act.16 As described therein, Capital City filed an action
seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to provide any coverage
or defense in regard to a conversion claim by a bank against a logging
company insured by Capital City. The bank's conversion claim against
the logging company was based on the logging company's action in
cutting down trees subject to the bank's pre-existing security interest.
As the basis for its position that the logging company's action fell outside
coverage, Capital City contended that the policy defined a covered
occurrence as an "accident," while the logging company's decision to cut
down the trees was intentional, and thus not an accident. The logging
company argued that its decision to cut down the trees qualified as an
accident because it resulted from its negligent failure to perform a title
search."
The district court rejected the company's argument and granted
Capital City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the
company's conduct must have resulted in unintended real consequences,
rather than simply legal consequences, in order to constitute an
"accident.""
"Use" Requires More Than a Tangential Connection
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Myers,'9 the
guardian of a disabled woman filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton
County against the driver of a car, alleging that the driver was liable for
a sexual assault on the disabled woman perpetrated by another
passenger during the trip.20 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (State Farm Auto) thereafter filed an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that the automobile liability insurance policy on
the car did not cover the damages resulting from the sexual assault.
The guardian and State Farm Auto filed cross motions for summary
C.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122395 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2012).
Id. at *19-20.
Id. at *34.
Id. at *19-20.
316 Ga. App. 152, 728 S.E.2d 787 (2012).
Id. at 152, 728 S.E.2d at 788.
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judgment.2 ' The guardian argued that the driver's "use" of the car
facilitated the assault against the woman, and thus the woman's
damages were covered by the policy because the policy provided that
State Farm Auto would "pay damages [that] an insured becomes legally
liable to pay because of ...

bodily damages to others ...

caused by

accident resulting from the . . . use of [the insured's] car.", 2 The trial
court granted summary judgment on the guardian's motion, State Farm
Auto appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. 23
Citing Davis v. Criterion Insurance Co.,24 and Payne v. Twiggs
County School District,' the court of appeals held that the driver's use
of the car was "only tangentially connected to [the disabled woman's]
injuries as the situs of the attack."26 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the woman's injuries did not result from the driver's actual "use" of
the car and State Farm Auto's policy was not implicated.2 7
What Is "Use" of a Vehicle for "Compensationor a Fee?"
In ProgressivePremierInsurance Co. of Illinois v. Newell, the court
of appeals resolved a question of first impression for Georgia courts. 29
In that case, Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinois
(Progressive Premier) sought a declaratory judgment against a pizza
delivery driver and the driver's employer following an accident involving
the driver. Progressive Premier contended that it had no duty to provide
any coverage or defense under a policy issued to the employer because
(1) the policy excluded claims "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any vehicle or trailer while being used to carry persons
or property for compensation or a fee," and (2) at the time of the
accident, and the driver was being paid $1.20 per house for delivering
pizzas, and the driver's accident arose out of his "use of [a] vehicle ...
to carry ... property for compensation or a fee." The employer counterclaimed, seeking coverage and a defense for the employer. The parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court of
Chatham County granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
and Progressive Premier appealed."o The court of appeals reversed.3 '
D.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 153, 728 S.E.2d at 788 (second alteration in original).
Id. at 152-53, 728 S.E.2d at 788.
179 Ga. App. 235, 345 S.E.2d 913 (1986).
269 Ga. 361, 496 S.E.2d 690 (1998).
Myers, 316 Ga. App. at 155, 728 S.E.2d at 789.
Id.
320 Ga. App. 301, 739 S.E.2d 756 (2013).
See id. at 303, 739 S.E.2d at 758.
Id. at 301-02, 739 S.E.2d at 757.
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In arriving at its decision, the court observed that Progressive
Premier's inclusion of the term "compensation" rendered the language
of its policy exclusion broader than language previously considered by
the court of appeals in FirstGeorgia Insurance Co. v. Goodrum,32 where
it deemed language excluding coverage for carriage of persons "for a fee"
to be inherently ambiguous." Noting that courts in other jurisdictions
had declined to require coverage for claims related to accidents involving
pizza delivery drivers where the relevant policy excluded claims arising
out of "use" of a vehicle to carry property "for compensation or a fee," the
court of appeals held that the employer's per-house payment to the
driver qualified as "compensation" for the carriage of property, bringing
the accident within the ambit of the policy exclusion and thus outside
the scope of coverage.
E. Questions Regarding Primary Residence
Another case involving the interpretation of policy provisions in an
automobile insurance policy was Parsons v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co." In Parsons, an insured teen died during a
traffic accident while riding in a car he owned. His mother appealed an
order by the State Court of Rockdale County granting summary
judgment to State Farm Auto and denying the mother's claim for
uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits against a policy issued to the
teen's aunt. The question of coverage turned on whether the teen
resided "primarily" with his aunt, because the State Farm Auto policy
excluded from coverage any vehicle "owned by or furnished for the
regular use of. . . any relative," and "defined 'relative' to mean 'a person
related to [the insured] . . . by blood, marriage or adoption who resides

primarily with [the insured].'"" Noting that there was conflicting
evidence regarding the teen's primary residence (namely that the teen
maintained an apartment with his cousin but also maintained a bedroom
at his aunt's home), the court of appeals reversed the trial court's order,
holding that summary judgment was inappropriate under the circumstances.
31. Id.
32. 187 Ga. App. 314, 370 S.E.2d 162 (1988).
33. Id. at 316, 370 S.E.2d at 164.
34. Newell, 320 Ga. App. at 305-06, 739 S.E.2d at 759.
35. 319 Ga. App. 616, 737 S.E.2d 718 (2013).
36. Id. at 617, 737 S.E.2d at 719-20.
37. Id. at 618-19, 737 S.E.2d at 720. But see Estate of Maddox v. Metro. Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 161283, at *4, 9 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2012) (granting insurer's
motion for summary judgment and holding that a son did not qualify as an "insured" for
purposes of his father's homeowner's policy because he maintained his own residence
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III. APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE
A number of cases reported during the survey period considered the
application and construction of various provisions of Georgia's Insurance
Code. Several of these cases have profound policy implications for
Georgia insurance law.
A.

Extension of the Mabry Rule
Royal Capital Development, LLC v. Maryland Casualty Co." may be
the most important case decided during the survey period. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with the
question of whether the Mabry rule-the requirement that an insurer
compensate an insured for his vehicle's diminished value resulting from
an automobile accident in addition to the actual cost of the repairs"-extends to standard insurance contracts for buildings."o
The insured, a building owner, submitted a claim to its insurer,
Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland Casualty), following damage to
the building caused by construction activity on an adjacent property. In
addition to the costs of repair, the owner sought coverage for post-repair
diminution in value resulting from the damage. Maryland Casualty
covered the costs of repair but refused to acknowledge responsibility for
diminished value. The owner filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton
County, and Maryland Casualty removed the action to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The owner moved
for summary judgment, contending that the Mabry rule required
Maryland Casualty to compensate the owner for its losses resulting from
diminished value. Maryland Casualty filed its own motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the Mabry rule only applied to automobile
insurance policies and citing the fact that the real property policy it
issued to the owner specifically excluded coverage for diminution-ofvalue damages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Maryland Casualty, and the owner appealed."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the
Georgia Supreme Court:

elsewhere and stayed at the father's residence rarely).
38. Royal Capital 1, 291 Ga. 262, 728 S.E.2d 234 (2012); see also Royal Capital Dev.,
LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 659 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Royal Capital II]
(certifying question to Georgia Supreme Court).
39. Mabry, 274 Ga. at 509, 556 S.E.2d at 123.
40. Royal Capital II, 659 F.3d at 1052.
41. Id.
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For an insurance contract providing coverage for "direct physical loss
of or damage to" a building that allows the insurer the option of paying
either "the cost of repairing the building" or "the loss of value," if the
insurer elects to . . . repair the building, must it also compensate the

insured for the diminution in value of the property resulting from
stigma due to its having been physically damaged[?]42
The Georgia Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, answered the
question affirmatively, holding that the Mabry rule applied to the
insurance contract at issue." As the basis for its decision, the supreme
court revisited its holding in Mabry, wherein it opined that
value, not condition, is the baseline for the measure of damages in a
claim under an automobile insurance policy in which the insurer
undertakes to pay for the insured's loss from a covered event, and that
a limitation [-]of[-] liability provision affording the insurer an option to
repair serves only to abate, not eliminate, the insurer's liability for the
difference between pre-loss value and post-loss value."
Noting that this principle has long been applied under Georgia law in
cases involving the proper determination for measuring damages to real
property, the supreme court observed that Georgia law "has consistently
held that the measure of damages in such cases is intended to place an
injured party, as nearly as possible, in the same position it would have
been if the injury had never occurred,"4 5 even where application of that
principle requires compensation for diminished value." Based on the
supreme court's pronouncement, the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
remanding the case for further proceedings in accordance with the
supreme court's opinion.4

42. Id. at 1055.
43. Royal Capital 1, 291 Ga. at 267, 728 S.E.2d at 238 (2012) (answering question
certified from Eleventh Circuit).
44. Id. at 264, 728 S.E.2d at 236 (quoting Mabry, 274 Ga. at 506, 556 S.E.2d at 121).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 264-65, 728 S.E.2d at 236. The supreme court qualified its holding, stating
that whether damages for diminution in value are recoverable under an insurance contract
depends on the specific language of the contract itself, to be resolved through application
of the general rules of contract construction. Id. at 267, 728 S.E.2d at 238.
47. Royal Capital Dev., LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 688 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 2012)
[hereinafter Royal CapitalIII] (remanding after receiving answer to certified question).
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B. Georgia Insurance Commissioner Exceeds His Authority in
PromulgatingRule Contrary to Statutory Language
Another case with significant implications for policy holders in Georgia
was White v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.' The Eleventh Circuit
was confronted with a dispute concerning the enforceability of an
insurance policy's requirement that a lawsuit against the insurer be
brought "within one year of the date of loss or damage" notwithstanding
regulatory authority purporting to require a minimum limitations period
of two years for all first-party actions based on an insurer's failure to
cover loss or damages to real or personal property. As presented by the
Eleventh Circuit and revealed in the record, the insured, a Georgia
resident, purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from State Farm
Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm Fire & Casualty)." The policy
was "a first-party insurance contract that provided multiple-line
coverage, including coverage for loss [attributable to] fire and theft.""
The policy also contained a provision requiring the insured to commence
any action against State Farm Fire & Casualty "within one year of the
date of loss or damage."5 After his home was burglarized in 2008, the
insured filed a claim against the policy for $135,000.52
State Farm Fire & Casualty denied coverage, determining that the
insured had made material misrepresentations in connection with his
claim. In June 2009, approximately fifteen months following the date of
the burglary, the insured filed a complaint against State Farm Fire &
Casualty, alleging claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and fraud.
State Farm Fire & Casualty removed the complaint to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that the the policy's one-year limitations
period barred the insured's claims. The insured responded by pointing
to Rule 120-2-20-.02 of Georgia's Comprehensive Rules & Regulations.5 3
Promulgated by Georgia's insurance commissioner in 2006, Rule 120-220-.02 provides:
No property ...

insurance policy providing first party insurance

coverage for loss or damage to any type of real or personal property
shall contain a contractual limitation requiring commencement of a
48. 664 F.3d 860 (11th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter White 1] (certifying two questions to
Georgia Supreme Court).
49. Id. at 862.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-20-.02 (2012).
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suit or action within a specified period of time less favorable to the
insured than that specified in the "Standard Fire Policy" promulgated
by the Commissioner in Chapter 120-2-19-.01 of these Rules and
Regulations.'
The Standard Fire Policy described in Rule 120-2-19-.0155 provides a
two-year limitations period for any action to recover on a claim.5 6
Relying on the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Fireman'sFund
Insurance Co. v. Dean," the district court ruled that the policy's oneyear limitation period violated Georgia law because it applied to
coverage for fires and reformed the policy to extend the limitation period
to two years." The district court concluded, however, that the policy's
one-year limitation period remained valid as it applied to coverage for
theft and granted State Farm Fire & Casualty's motion for summary
judgment as to its insured's claim for breach of contract."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following two questions
to the Georgia Supreme Court:
(1) Did the Georgia Insurance Commissioner act within his legal
authority when he promulgated Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. [120-2-20-.021,
such that a multiple-line insurance policy providing first-party
insurance coverage for theft-related property damage must be reformed
to conform with the two-year limitation period provided for in Georgia's
Standard Fire Policy, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-19-.01? (2) Is this
action barred by the [plolicy's one-year limitation period?'
In regard to the first question, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
commissioner had exceeded his authority, determining that the
requirements of Rule 120-2-20-.02 were at odds with the language of
section 33-32-1(a) of the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.)," which
only require that the terms of the Standard Fire Policy be incorporated

54. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-20-.02.
55. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-19-.01 (2006).
56. GA. COMP. R. & REGs. 120-2-19-.01 ("No suit or action on this policy for the recovery
of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements
of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within two (2) years
next after inception of the loss.").
57. 212 Ga. App. 262, 265, 441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1994) ("In Georgia, the clear mandate
of O.C.G.A. § 33-32-1(a) requires that the language of Fireman's Fund's insurance policy
be as favorable to the insured as the language in the Standard Fire Policy.").
58. White 1, 664 F.3d at 863.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 865.
61. O.C.G.A. § 33-32-1(a) (2013).
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into the fire coverage provisions of a multiple-line policy.62 As to the
second question, the supreme court concluded that the insured's action
was barred because the one-year limitation period contained in the State
Farm Fire & Casualty policy was enforceable.
Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. 4
C. Place of Delivery of Insurance Policy Is Not Dispositive
The case of St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Hughes" is also
likely to significantly impact Georgia insurance law in the coming years.
In that case, an employee filed suit against St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company (St. Paul), his employer's commercial umbrella
liability insurer, seeking uninsured motorist benefits for injuries he
suffered while operating a truck insured under the policy. The employee
resided in Georgia, the accident occurred in Georgia, and the truck was
principally garaged and used in Georgia. However, the policy, which
specifically excluded coverage of uninsured motorist benefits, was issued
and delivered to the employer in Indiana, which did not require
uninsured motorist coverage at the time the policy was issued.66 The
Superior Court of Bacon County granted summary judgment in the
employee's favor, St. Paul appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed."
As the basis for its decision, the court noted that Georgia's uninsured
motorist statute specifically prohibited insurers from issuing or
delivering automobile or motor vehicle liability policies "upon any motor
vehicle then principallygaragedor principally used" in Georgia without
"an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums
[that] said insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." While recogniz62. White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 291 Ga. 306, 308-09, 728 S.E.2d 685, 687
(2012) [hereinafter White II] (answering two questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit).
63. Id. at 309, 728 S.E.2d at 687.
64. White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 694 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter
White III] (affirming the district court after receiving answers to questions certified to the
Georgia Supreme Court). The decision in White appears to have already affected litigation
strategy in insurance coverage disputes. For example, in Dalton v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40877 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2013), State Farm Fire &
Casualty Company moved to dismiss a claim for breach of contract under a homeowner's
policy on the ground that its insureds failed to file suit within one year from the date their
home exploded. Id. at *3-4. The insureds moved for leave to amend their pleadings "to
more clearly allege that the losses [at issue] were caused by fire." Id. at *4.
65. 321 Ga. App. 738, 742 S.E.2d 762 (2013).
66. Id. at 739, 742 S.E.2d at 763-64.
67. Id. at 738-39, 742 S.E.2d at 763.
68. Id. at 740, 742 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1)).
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ing that Georgia conflict-of-laws rules generally require insurance
contracts to be governed by the law of the place where they are
delivered," the court observed that none of the authority relied upon
by St. Paul addressed a situation where "a Georgia resident was injured
in an accident while driving a vehicle that was principally garaged and
used in Georgia."o Under such circumstances, the court concluded, "it
was reasonable for the parties to assume that Georgia was the principal
location of risk and to expect that Georgia law, rather than Indiana law,
would be determinative on the issue of whether the [policy provides
[uninsured motorist] coverage."7 1
D. A Cargo Insurance Policy Does Not Qualify as a Motor Vehicle
Liability Insurance Policy
In Equipco International, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London,72 the Georgia Court of Appeals was confronted by the question
of whether a cargo liability insurance policy might qualify as a motor
vehicle liability insurance policy under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-7,7 which
imposes affirmative duties upon issuers of motor vehicle liability
insurance policies to settle certain losses with third parties. 74 As
recounted therein, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (the
Underwriters) issued a policy to a motor common carrier (the Carrier)." The policy provided coverage for "legal liability for cargo 'in transit,"' and defined "in transit" as "the time the goods are in the exclusive
custody and control of the 'carrier' and continuously until the transporting vehicle arrives at the destination premises and [the goods] are
transferred to the exclusive custody and control of the consignee,
warehousemen, or receiver."76 Equipco International, LLC (Equipco)
hired the Carrier to transport a forklift, which was subsequently
damaged when the Carrier's driver hit an overpass. The Underwriters
thereafter rescinded the policy on the ground that the Carrier had made
material misrepresentations to the Underwriters, and Equipco filed an
action for bad faith against the Underwriters pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-

69. See, e.g., Colony Ins. Co. v. 9400 Abercorn, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131839, at
*34 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2012) ("Under the Georgia conflict-of-laws rule the place of the
delivery of the insurance contract controls.").
70. Hughes, 321 Ga. App. at 741-42, 742 S.E.2d at 765.
71. Id. at 742, 742 S.E.2d at 765.
72. 320 Ga. App. 345, 739 S.E.2d 797 (2013).
73. O.C.G.A. § 33-4-7 (Supp. 2013).
74. Equipco Int'l, LLC, 320 Ga. App. at 345, 739 S.E.2d at 798 (discussing O.C.G.A.
§ 33-4-7).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 346, 739 S.E.2d at 798.
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4-7, ostensibly hoping to force the Underwriters to extend coverage for
The
Equipco's loss notwithstanding its status as a third party."
Superior Court of Cobb County granted the Underwriters' motion to
dismiss Equipco's claim, and Equipco appealed."
On appeal, Equipco argued that the trial court erred because "the
ordinary and everyday meaning of the term 'motor vehicle liability
insurance policy' include [d] the cargo liability policy because the policy
covered liability for damage to cargo carried by a motor vehicle."" The
court of appeals rejected Equipco's attempt to conflate the Underwriters'
cargo insurance policy with a motor vehicle liability insurance policy,
observing that the former "covered more than simply . . . liability for
damage to the cargo while the cargo was being carried by a motor
vehicle," and that the cargo insurance policy did not include those
elements necessary to satisfy the standards for motor vehicle liability
insurance policies under Georgia law.'
Noting that "[niothing in
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-7 indicates that the legislature intended the phrase
'motor vehicle liability insurance policy' to have a new and different
meaning in that Code section so as to include policies that did not meet
the coverage requirements imposed upon all motor vehicle liability
insurance policies in Georgia," the court concluded that Equipco's claim
for bad faith was improper."'

E. CorroborationNot Required Where Direct Evidence Exists
The case of Reaves v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co."
also merits specific examination. In Reaves, a wife filed suit against
State Farm Auto for uninsured motorist benefits after her husband died
following an accident while operating a truck owned by his employer.
According to a witness, the accident occurred when an unknown vehicle
77. Id. at 345, 739 S.E.2d at 798-99. Section 33-4-7(a) of Georgia's Insurance Code
provides:
In the event of a loss because of injury to or destruction of property covered by a
motor vehicle liability insurance policy, the insurer issuing such policy has an
affirmative duty to adjust that lose fairly and promptly, to make a reasonable
effort to investigate and evaluate the claim, and, where liability is reasonably
clear, to make a good faith effort to settle with the claimant potentially entitled
to recover against the insured under such policy.
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-7(a).
78. Equipco Int'l, LLC, 320 Ga. App. at 347, 739 S.E.2d at 799.
79. Id. at 348, 739 S.E.2d at 799.
80. Id. at 348, 739 S.E.2d at 798-99; see also O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(aX1) (2013) ("All
policies of motor vehicle liability insurance issued in this state must be in accordance with
the requirements of this chapter.").
81. Equipco Int'l, LLC, 320 Ga. App. at 349-50, 739 S.E.2d at 800-01.
82. 319 Ga. App. 426, 734 S.E.2d 773 (2012).
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swerved into the lane in which the decedent was driving, causing his
truck to lose control and collide with a highway barrier. While the
witness could not state whether the unknown vehicle and the truck
actually collided, post-accident statements made by the decedent to his
physician and his employer and during a deposition indicated that
contact had taken place." State Farm Auto nevertheless moved for
summary judgment, citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX2) for the proposition
that coverage might only attach where there was "actual physical
contact" between the unknown vehicle and the decedent's truck.' The
State Court of Henry County granted State Farm Auto's motion, holding
that the evidence presented by the decedent's wife was circumstantial
and thus required additional corroboration under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11.
The trial court, however, did not consider the issue of whether the
decedent's statements were admissible."
The court of appeals reversed, observing that the trial court had
framed the issue incorrectly: "While it is clear that O.C.G.A. § 33-711(b)(2) requires eyewitness corroboration in the event that there is no
physical contact, the issue squarely before us is whether corroboration
is required where there is direct evidence of actual physical contact."'
Because the decedent's statements would constitute direct evidence of
actual physical contact if admissible, the court held that corroboration
was not required, and that summary judgment in the insurer's favor was
therefore inappropriate."

83. Id. at 427, 734 S.E.2d at 774.
84. Id. at 427-28, 734 S.E.2d at 775. Section 33-7-11(bX2) of Georgia's Insurance Code
provides:
A motor vehicle shall be deemed to be uninsured if the owner or operator of the
motor vehicle is unknown. In those cases, recovery under the endorsement or
provisions shall be subject to the conditions set forth in subsections (c) through (j)
of this Code section and, in order for the insured to recover under the endorsement
where the owner or operator of any motor vehicle [that] causes bodily injury or
property damage to the insured is unknown, actual physical contact must have
occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and
the person or property of the insured. Such physical contact shall not be required
if the description by the claimant of how the occurrence occurred is corroborated
by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than the claimant.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX2).
85. Reaves, 319 Ga. App. at 428, 734 S.E.2d at 774-75.
86. Id. at 428, 734 S.E.2d at 775.
87. Id. at 428-30, 734 S.E.2d at 775-76.
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F Joint Tenancy Does Not Foreclose Right to Recover Entire Value of
Loss
8 a
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Franks,"
homeowner fied suit against his insurer, Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company (GFB), following the insurer's decision to pay out
one-half of the policy limits after the homeowner's house was destroyed
by fire." Even though the homeowner was listed as the only insured
on his policy, GFB contended that the homeowner was only entitled to
one-half share of the insurance proceeds because he had "executed a
warranty deed, conveying the property to himself and to his domestic
partner . .. 'as joint tenants with survivorship and not as tenants in
common."'o The Superior Court of Floyd County denied the parties'
cross motions for summary judgment, but granted the insurer's motion
for interlocutory appeal.9 ' The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.9 2
Quoting its prior decision in Sams v. McDonald," the court of
appeals observed that as joint tenants, the homeowner and his partner
shared "one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same
conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and
the same undivided possession." Accordingly, the court reasoned that,
"although ownership is shared, the title and interest are not divided into
fractional shares . . . [thus, the homeowner's] title and interest in the

insured property [were] undivided, that is, 100[%].""
G. Third-Party ClaimantDoes Not Have Standing to Bring a Claim
Without First Obtaininga Judgment
In Tiller v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 96 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had
occasion to consider third-party property damage claims for diminished
value arising out of automobile accidents filed on behalf of a putative

88. 320 Ga. App. 131, 739 S.E.2d 427 (2013).
89. Id. at 131-33, 739 S.E.2d at 428-30.
90. Id. at 132-33, 739 S.E.2d at 429-30.
91. Id. at 131, 739 S.E.2d at 428.
92. Id.
93. 117 Ga. App. 336, 160 S.E.2d 594 (1968).
94. Franks,320 Ga. App. at 135, 739 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting Sams, 117 Ga. App. at 340,
160 S.E.2d at 598).
95. Id.
96. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15726 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013).
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class."
Specifically, the plaintiffs in Tiller sought a declaratory
judgment that the method State Farm Auto used to determine diminished value was contrary to Georgia law." State Farm Auto moved to
dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory
judgment was barred under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-7,99 which requires a thirdparty claimant to obtain a judgment against an insured before bringing
an action against his insurer."oo Noting the plaintiffs' failure to
comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 33-4-7 before filing suit
against State Farm Auto and the absence of any allegations suggesting
any urgency with respect to the declarations sought, the district court
granted State Farm Auto's motion, holding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and that their claim was designed to prompt the court into
making a premature "legal determination about the extent of State
Farm's liability under the guise of a declaratory judgment."o

IV. WAIVER
The issue of waiver continues to be a hot topic. In a series of cases
decided during the survey period, Georgia courts continued to clarify the
rules governing how and when an insurer might waive its right to
contest coverage.
A. Insurer Cannot Deny a Claim and Reserve Its Right to Assert
Other Defenses at a Later Date
In Hoover v. Maxum Indemnity Co.,"o' the Georgia Supreme Court
held that an insurer could not deny coverage yet reserve its right to
assert additional bases for denying coverage at a later date. 0 s In that
case, an injured employee filed a lawsuit against his employer, who
copied the complaint to Maxum, its insurer. Maxum responded by
disclaiming coverage and refusing to defend, citing an employer liability
exclusion contained in the policy issued to the employer. Maxum also
purported to reserve the right to assert late notice and included
97. Id. at *1.
98. Id. at *7. The plaintiffs also alleged that State Farm Auto engaged in fraud, that
State Farm Auto was unjustly enriched at the plaintiffs' expense, that State Farm Auto
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that State Farm Auto should be
required to provide plaintiffs with information so that they might adequately determine
the amount they were owed under their diminished value claims. Id. at *7, 23. The
district court dismissed each of these claims. Id. at *23-24.
99. Id. at *7.
100. O.C.G.A. 33-4-7(a)-(c).
101. Tiller, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15726, at *7-10.
102. 291 Ga. 402, 730 S.E.2d 413 (2012).
103. Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

150

[Vol. 65

boilerplate language to reserve any other defense that might arise. After
the employee obtained judgment against his employer, the employer
assigned its claims against Maxum to the employee and the employee
filed suit against Maxum, asserting breach of the duty to defend and
seeking indemnification. The Superior Court of Cobb County granted
Maxum's motion for summary judgment, finding that the employer failed
to provide timely notice of the accident. The trial court also granted the
employee's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Maxum
breached its duty to defend the underlying tort action.'04 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's order on the timely notice issue but
reversed on the issue of Maxum's duty to defend."10
The supreme court "granted certiorari to determine whether the
[clourt of [alppeals properly analyzed the claim that Maxum waived its
right to assert a defense based on untimely notice and whether timely
notice of the occurrence was a prerequisite to Maxum having a duty to
defend in the underlying tort action."n0 6 Upon review, the supreme
court held that Maxum had waived its right, concluding that the
appellate court erred when it held that Maxum "could both deny the
As the
claim and reserve its right to assert other defenses later."'
court opined:
The disclaimer language in Maxum's denial letter purporting to reserve
its rights to assert certain defenses later was not a reservation of rights
in the sense that term is used in the insurance industry .... Mhe
standard and acceptable procedure for an insurer to determine its
rights is to agree to defend under a reservation of rights and then file
a declaratory judgment action.'o
Accordingly, having determined that Maxum waived its right to assert
a defense based on untimely notice, the supreme court held that the
court of appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's order holding
that Maxum breached its duty to defend. 09
Similarly, in Moon v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,11o the lessees of a
residence filed suit against Cincinnati Insurance Company (Cincinnati),
their lessor's insurer, on the ground that Cincinnati's refusal to defend
the lessees in an action arising out of a child's drowning in a swimming
pool, pursuant to a homeowner's policy issued to the lessor, constituted

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 402-04, 730 S.E.2d at 415-16.
Id. at 402, 730 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 403, 730 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17.
Id. at 405-06, 730 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17.
920 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
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bad faith failure to settle, breach of contract, and statutory bad
faith."' Cincinnati initially provided a defense following the lessees'
execution of bilateral non-waiver agreements, but subsequently denied
coverage and ceased defending them, stating as the basis for the denial
that the lessees were not insureds under the lessor's policy. The action
was removed to federal court in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, and the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment." 2 In evaluating the parties' motions, the district
court focused on the question of whether the insurer was limited to the
coverage defenses specifically set forth in its denial letter, or whether it
might assert other defenses." 3 Relying on Hoover, the district court
rejected the possibility that Cincinnati might assert additional defenses,
noting that Cincinnati "chose to deny coverage outright as opposed to
seeking a declaratory judgment action after filing its reservation of
rights.""'
The district court further opined: "[T]he reservation of
rights was extinguished when Cincinnati denied coverage because a
reservation 'does not exist so that an insurer who has denied coverage
may continue to investigate to come up with additional reasons on which
the denial could be based.""
Consequently, the district court concluded that Cincinnati had, "failed to properly reserve its rights [to
assert additional defenses] when it denied [the insured's] claims on
[specific grounds] and refused to undertake a defense," and therefore was
limited to the defenses specifically described in its letter denying
coverage.1 6
B. Insurer Cannot Knowingly Settle Non-Covered Claims Absent
Specific Reservation of Rights
In Facility Investments, LP v. Homeland Insurance Co. of New
York,"' the court of appeals held that the insurer, Homeland Insurance Company of New York (Homeland), failed to reserve its rights
under the uncovered-loss-allocation provision of a policy it issued to a
nursing home, and was thus obliged to cover the full cost of a settlement
though a portion of the settlement was based on non-covered claims."'

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
at 417).
117.
118.

Id. at 1302-03.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1305.
Id. (quoting Hoover, 291 Ga. at 406, 730 S.E.2d at 417).
Id. at 1305-06 (alterations in original) (quoting Hoover, 291 Ga. at 405, 730 S.E.2d
321 Ga. App. 103, 741 S.E.2d 228 (2013).
Id. at 104, 110, 741 S.E.2d at 230, 234.
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As described therein, the nursing home was sued by a patient, who
alleged claims for negligence, fraud, and intentional misconduct.
Homeland reserved its rights to deny coverage for losses arising out of
allegations of fraud, malice, and regulatory violations, but failed to
reserve its rights to pursue claims for breach of contract, contribution,
or recoupment, with respect to any uncovered portion of the loss. During
discovery, the patient made a settlement demand to the nursing home
for the $1 million policy limit. Homeland agreed to settle for the policy
limit if the nursing home contributed 50% of the amount. The nursing
home objected, prompting Homeland to tender a second letter, this time
reserving its right to pursue claims against the nursing home under the
policy's uncovered-loss-allocation provision. Following settlement,
Homeland sued the nursing home to recover that portion of the
settlement attributable to non-covered claims."i9 The State Court of
Fulton County denied the nursing home's motion to dismiss, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding that Homeland waived its right to
pursue recovery of uncovered amounts of the settlement payment when
it settled the underlying claims with knowledge of the grounds for noncoverage.120
In arriving at its decision, the court of appeals observed that
Homeland had two options once the nursing home refused Homeland's
settlement conditions-it could either deny coverage or seek declaratory
relief.'2 ' However, because Homeland defended the case without
specifically reserving its rights with regard to the uncovered-lossallocation provision, and thereafter settled the underlying suit with
knowledge of the uncovered claims instead of denying coverage or
seeking declaratory relief, Homeland waived any right to seek reimbursement for uncovered amounts of the settlement.122
V. SETTLEMENT
Several cases during the survey period focused on the issue of
settlement, helping to reshape and redefine the contours of a valid
settlement under state law.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 104-05, 741 S.E.2d at 230-31.
at 105-06, 741 S.E.2d at 231.
at 109, 741 S.E.2d at 233.
at 110, 741 S.E.2d at 234.
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A. Allocating Settlement ProceedsPursuantto Uninsured Motorist
Provisions
One of the more intriguing cases reported during the survey period
was Carter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance Co. 2 ' In that case, the
claimant was injured in an automobile accident in which the other driver
was allegedly under the influence of alcohol.'2' The claimant sued the
other driver in the State Court of Cobb County pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 33-24-41. 1,125 eventually agreeing to settle the matter with the other
driver and his insurer for payment of the $30,000 limit of liability
coverage on condition that $29,000 of the coverage limit be allocated to
payment of punitive damages and that $1000 be allocated towards
payment of compensatory damages.126 The purpose of the claimant's
condition was plain-because uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 applies only to compensatory
damages and excludes coverage for punitive damages, the claimant
sought to exhaust the coverage limits of the other driver's insurance
policy before making a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under
her own policy with Progressive so that she might increase her
recovery.127 Following service by the claimant on Progressive Mountain Insurance Company (Progressive Mountain), her underinsured
benefits carrier, Progressive Mountain cross-claimed for any amount
required to be paid to the claimant on its underinsured motorist
coverage. The trial court granted Progressive Mountain's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that the claimant had failed to comply with
the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, which is necessary for the
recovery of benefits. 2 ' The claimant appealed and the court of appeals
affirmed.2 9
In reaching its decision, the court looked first to the purpose behind
§ 33-24-41.1:
To facilitate settlements, the limited release provisions of O.C.G.A.
§ 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a
claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfea-

123. 320 Ga. App. 271, 739 S.E.2d 750 (2013).
124. Id. at 272, 739 S.E.2d at 751-52.
125. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 (2013).
126. Carter,320 Ga. at 272, 739 S.E.2d at 752.
127. Id. at 272-73, 739 S.E.2d at 752-53; see also Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290,
509 S.E.2d 41, 42 (1998) ("The court of appeals correctly held that a party must exhaust
available liability coverage before recovering under [an uninsured motorist] policy.").
128. Carter,320 Ga. at 272, 739 S.E.2d at 752.
129. Id. at 272, 739 S.E.2d at 751.
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sor's liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while
preserving the claimant's pending claim for underinsured motorist
benefits against the claimant's own insurance carrier. 30
Noting that the plain language of the statute limited coverage to
"injuries to ...

claimants," the court held that the claimant's condition

regarding payment by the other driver's insurer was inconsistent with
the statute's purpose because it purported to compensate the claimant
beyond her actual injuries and losses, a result the legislature did not
intend."3 1 As the court concluded:
The allocation of punitive damages to force exhaustion of liability
coverage does not advance the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage to increase available compensation for actual injuries and
losses; indirectly shifts payment of punitive damages from the liability
carrier to the underinsured motorist carrier, contrary to the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage; and would ultimately increase
underinsured motorist coverage premiums as a result of tortsfeasors'
wrongs."a3

B. Release Controls the Terms of Settlement
Carterwas not the only case involving uninsured- and underinsuredmotorist coverage settlements. In Arnold v. Neal,'a an injured
motorist sought to overturn an order enforcing the terms of a settlement
agreement between the driver and his insurer, Allstate Insurance
Company (Allstate)."' As recounted therein, the motorist suffered
injuries after the car operated by the other driver collided head-on with
her vehicle. Several weeks after the accident occurred, the motorist's
attorney offered to settle the matter for $100,000, the limits of the other
driver's policy, in exchange for a limited release. Allstate's adjuster
thereafter contacted the motorist's attorney ten days before the deadline
contained in his letter, offering to settle the matter as described by the
attorney and requesting information as to how to issue the check. The
next day, Allstate's attorney sent the motorist's attorney a draft release
and stated that he would work with the motorist's attorney in the event
the specific language proposed in the release was not acceptable.'3 5
Allstate subsequently forwarded a check to the motorist's attorney
containing the annotation: "Full [and] final settlement of any and all

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 273, 739 S.E.2d at 753.
Id. at 274, 739 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(bX1)).
Id. at 274-75, 739 S.E.2d at 753.
320 Ga. App. 289, 738 S.E.2d 707 (2013).
Id. at 292, 738 S.E.2d at 709-10.
Id. at 290-91, 738 S.E.2d at 708-09.
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claims for bodily injury arising from [the motorist's] loss [on] 12/20/10."13' Two weeks later, the motorist's attorney filed suit against the
other driver in the Superior Court of Clayton County and contacted
Allstate's attorney, stating that Allstate's annotation amounted to a
rejection of the settlement offer and rejecting Allstate's offer to issue
another check without the annotation. Allstate responded by filing a
motion for summary judgment to enforce the terms of the parties'
settlement.13 The trial court granted Allstate's motion and the court
of appeals affirmed, ruling that the release tendered by Allstate
complied with the terms dictated by the motorist's attorney regardless
of whether the check contained a contrary annotation: "[Tihe release
that Allstate provided was limited in scope, exactly as [the motorist] had
requested, and 'where the terms of a written release are clear and
unambiguous, the court 3will look to the release alone to find the
intention of the parties."' s
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

Finally, a number of cases addressed a range of interesting but less
notable issues. In Garrison v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.,'
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
denied a life insurance company's motion to dismiss a beneficiary's claim
for breach of contract where the company failed to relinquish complete
control of insurance policy proceeds and instead deposited the proceeds
in a checking account in the beneficiary's name.' 4 0 In Kovacs v.
Cornerstone National Insurance Co.,141 the court of appeals confirmed
Georgia's long-standing rule that an insurer may avoid coverage of a loss
where an insured fails to include pertinent information in her application for insurance.'4 2 In Silver v. Bad Boy Enterprises, LLC,' 4' the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia rejected
the argument that O.C.G.A. § 33-3-28'" requires a party to disclose
the remaining insurance coverage available under an "eroding limits"
policy, noting that O.C.G.A. § 33-3-28 only requires a party to provide

136. Id. at 291, 738 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting the letter regarding the limited-liability
release).
137. Id. at 291-92, 738 S.E.2d at 709-10.
138. Id. at 293-94, 738 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, LLC,
265 Ga. App. 812, 816, 595 S.E.2d 633, 637 (2004)).
139. 908 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
140. Id. at 1295, 1305.
141. 318 Ga. App. 99, 736 S.E.2d 105 (2012).
142. Id. at 99-100, 736 S.E.2d at 106-07.
143. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39140 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2013).
144. O.C.G.A. § 33-3-28 (2000).
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"the name of the insurer, the name of each insured, and the limits of
coverage," or "a copy of the declaration page of each such policy in lieu
And in Camacho v. Nationwide
of providing such information.""
the United States District Court for the
Mutual Insurance Co.,
Northern District of Georgia held that a plaintiff could discover
communications exchanged between an insurer, its insured, and their
counsel, under the joint-defense or common-interest privilege following
the insured's assignment of his claims against his insurer to the
plaintiff."'

145. Silver, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39140, at *3 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-3-28(aXl)).
146. 287 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
147. Id. at 693.

